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RETURN TO THE STONE AGE ... THE
REGULATION OF PROGRAM
TRADING
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, the financial markets in the United States experienced the
largest point-advances and declines in history. On January 23, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) x climbed 64 points, only to fall 114
points in a period of seventy minutes. 2 On October 19, 1987, also known
as "Black Monday," the DJIA suffered its single greatest point loss for
a day - a drop of 508 points or 22.6% in value. 3 Yet, most economic in4
dicators for the year were generally positive.
These great price movements, or market volatility, has generally
been tied to a single activity in the financial markets. This activity is
known as "program trading." Suspicions have been raised about this
practice, which is a form of computerized arbitrage linking the stocks
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to various stock-index futures listed on the Chicago markets. 5 Critics of program trading range
from John Phelan, Chairman of the NYSE, to Congressman John
1. The DJIA is an index composed of thirty stocks. It is the foremost indicator of
the condition of the stock markets. The DJIA comprises the following stocks: Alcoa, Allied Signal, American Express, AT&T, Bethlehem Steel, Boeing, Cheveron, Coca-Cola,
DuPont, Eastman Kodak, Exxon, General Electric, General Motors, Goodyear, IBM, International Paper, McDonald's, Mereck, 3M, Navistar, Philip Morris, Primerica, Proctor &
Gambel, Sears Roebuck, Texaco, USX, Union Carbide, United Technologies, Westinghouse and Woolworth.
2. What Next? Investors Seek Clues In Friday'sFrenzied Stock Trading, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 26, 1987, at 25, col. 4 [hereinafter Frenzied Stock Trading] (the volume on the New
York Stock Exchange set a record with over 302 million shares changing hands. This beat
the previous record volume, set the previous week, by nearly 50 million shares). See also
Laderman and Frank, What Makes The Market Swing So Wildly, Bus. WK., Feb. 9, 1987,
at 72.
3. Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6
[hereinafter Stocks Plunge] (losers led gainers by a 40 to 1 margin. A margin of 3 to 1 is
considered a rout. Over 604 million shares traded hands).
4. See Baker Expresses Optimism, Criticizes West Germany On Rising Interest
Rates, Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1987, at 3, col. 3 (comments of Treasury Secretary James
Baker).
5. See Laderman and Frank, How Chicago Zaps Wall Street, Bus. WK., September
29, 1986, at 92, 93.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. VIII

Dingell (D-Mich), Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee which oversees the Securities and Exchange Commission. 6 Fearing further volatility, these and other individuals are looking for ways
to regulate program trading.
This Note examines the interrelation between stocks and financial
commodities and how program trading effects their prices. It then
briefly analyses the benefits and problems stemming from the computerized trading practice. The Note also presents various proposed solutions to program trading problems. It discusses whether these solutions
address problems arising from the introduction of computer technology
to the markets or problems stemming from the use of stock-index
futures.
II.

THE ACTION

Program trading is a relatively new form of financial arbitrage.7 It
is one of many forms of stock-index related strategies which include activities such as portfolio insurance. Arbitrage, as used in program trading, consists of the simultaneous purchase and sale of stock index
futures and the bundle of stocks that make up that index. The majority
of the stock index futures are traded on the Chicago markets. Stock index futures are a form of commodity contract, just like a contract for
wheat, sugar or gold. Commodities have their roots in the agricultural
markets, dating back to the time of the Civil War.8 Unlike most commodities, which are used as a means of shifting risk from the producer
of a product to a speculator and require delivery of the product at expiration, the stock-index futures are a form of financial commodity. The
financial commodity is considered an efficient way to "buy the market,"
a method of accepting a risk-return ratio equal to the ratio experienced
by the market as a whole.
Various stock-index futures are based on either well known broadbased stock indices, such as the Standard & Poor (S&P) 500,9 or specific
well-known stocks, such as the Major Market Index (MMI). 10 Foreign
6. See The Big Board's CrusadeAgainst ProgramTrading, Bus. WK., March 23, 1987,

at 134 [hereinafter Crusade];Rep. John Dingell Inquires Into Causes of Market Fall, Wall
St. J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 4, col. 4. See also Dingell Asks SEC To Analyze Impact Of Program
Trading On Stock Markets, 18 SEc. REG. & L. REP. 586 (1986).

7. Stock-index futures, an integral part of program trading, did not become available
for trading until February 1982.
8. See generally J. MARKHAM,THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND

rIs REGULATION (1987) (a history of commodities).
9. S&P 500 is made up of 400 industrial companies, 40 utilities, 20 transportation

companies and 40 financial institutions.
10. See BYRNE, THE STOCK INDEX FuTuREs MARKET 22-23 (1987) [hereinafter BYRNE]

(the MMI was developed in 1983 by the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in response
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stock indices" and narrow-based stock indices, based on a group of
stocks from a certain industry like high-technology or oil production,
also exist. 1 2 Unlike most commodity futures, which require settlement
through delivery of the commodity, stock-index futures are cash settled 13 Which means that, upon the close of the market, the future expires. Cash must be paid to the holder of the future based on the price
of the index.
Stock indexes have cash values. For price-weighted indexes, cash
values are the sum of the price of each component stock divided by a
number determined at the creation of the index. The divisor is used to
convert the value of the index into amounts that are easier to trade.
The cash value for stock indexes and their corresponding futures do not
always have the same value. In the static mode, however, futures
should sell at a slight premium over the index value. Although an investor, who buys a futures contract which represents ownership of an
entire basket of stocks, loses in dividend income, he realizes his loss in
interest income since he invests a fraction of the purchase price of all
the stocks in the index. The equation illustrating the relationship between the price of the futures and the stock index is F = S(1 + r - d),
where the price of the futures contract is F, the underlying stock index
price is S, where r is the riskless rate of interest over the life of the conon
tract and d is the rate at which dividend income is expected to accrue
14
an investment in the underlying index over the same contract life.
In the market, two basic considerations1s govern the pricing of the
to a perceived desirability to trade in the Dow; sixteen of the twenty stocks in the MMI
are part of the DJIA. Dow Jones will not permit it's industrial average to be used as a
basis for a financial commodity. AMEX, however, reported a .97 correlation between the
MMI and the Dow.) See also id at 23 (for a list of the stocks that make up the MMI).
11. Id. at 28.
12. See Seligman, The Structure of the Options Market, 10 J. CORP. L. 141, 150 (Fall
1984). See also Growth of Stock-Index Products to Slow Because of Market Crash, Official
Say, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1987, at 44, col. 3 (while most narrow-based indices do not trade in
large volume and financial commodities are coming under increase regulatory scrutiny,
new forms of stock iidices are being suggested to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTc)). Cf. Program Trading: Plunge Raises Regulatory Issues, Los Angeles
Times, Oct. 21, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 5 (SEC's veto power over new financial commodities
never used). But cf. Dingell Warns SEC To Take Action Soon On Curbing Program Trading Volatility, 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 221 (1987) (reminding the financial community of
legislation that would place a moratorium on financial products).
13. See BYRNE, supra note 10, at 34-5.
14. See Stoll and Whaley, Program Trading and Expiration-Day Effects, FIN. ANALYST J., March-April 1987, at 16 (for a more detailed explanation of this equation). See
also, BYRNE, supra note 10, at 167-218 (for an in-depth discussion of the pricing
relationship).
15. The above is not a comprehensive list of considerations as there are many factors
that influence the market. See BYRNE, supra note 10, at 99-166 (for an in-depth look at
index price movements).
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stock-index future as based on the index's cash value. The first is the
investor's outlook on the market. If investor sentiment is bullish, and
an upward move in prices is predicted, the futures will sell at a premium over the value of the index. Conversely, if sentiment is bearish,
and a price fall is expected, then the futures will sell at a discount. The
second consideration in pricing stock-index futures is the margin requirements for each instrument. Buying a security on margin is a form
of leverage because a broker allows one to pay only part of the purchase
price of the security. An investor who wants to take advantage of an
upward movement in the market, to realizes greater gains by buying on
margin. Buying stocks on margin requires a 50% down-payment, where
corresponding futures contracts require only 10%.16 The importance of
17
the margin requirement of securities depends on if one is short selling
the futures or the underlying stocks.
The key to program trading is the computer. A computer program
actively tracks the prices of individual stocks and futures, the dividend
yields, the interest rates, and the expiration dates of the futures contracts.' 8 Tracking the spread between a single stock and the option sold
for that stock is relatively easy and requires no computer. Yet, with a
stock-index, a trader is dealing with as many as 500 stocks and must
track all simultaneously. 19 The computer can also be used as a cost cutting device by using it to trade fewer stocks than those that are included
in the index. Computer models can demonstrate the correlation of (or
lack thereof) a small group of component stocks to the index. Some
traders engage in arbitrage programs using about half of the S&P 500
20
stocks and follow the index with 95% accuracy.
Generally, traders use either "buy" or "sell" programs. The choice
16. Angrist, The Not So Awful Truth, FoRBEs, March 23, 1987, at 180 (by purchasing
the futures contract on margin, instead of the underlying stocks, most investors' funds are
free to be invested in short-term interest-paying instruments, such as T-bills). See also
Selkin and Walsh, Program Trading In Action: How An Aberration Pays Off, FUTURES,
July 1986, at 52; BYRNE, supra note 10, at 40-43 (for an in-depth discussion of buying
stocks on margin).

17. In the securities market, one often hears the old saying "buy low, sell high." This,
however, can only work in an advancing market. In a falling market, an investor can still
follow this advice through short selling, an investor borrows stocks and immediately sells
them on the open market, hoping that the price will fall and he can later buy them back
at a lower price.
18. Laderman, Follow the "Spread," or the Market Will Leave You Behind, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 29, 1986, at 84 (computers also take the anxiety out of predicting market move-

ments). See BYRNE, supra note 10, at 71-97 (for a discussion of the psychology of the
trader).
19. Laderman, Weiss, Frank, Cohan and Cuneo, Those Big Swings On Wall Street,
Bus. WK., April 7, 1986, at 32 (four years ago, arbitrage couldn't be done, since traders
didn't have the computer software necessary to track prices by the minute).
20. Weiss, "Rocket Scientists" Are Revolutionizing Wall Street, Bus. WK., April 21,
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of program depends on whether futures are selling at a premium or a
discount to the cash value of the stock index. A trader executes a buy
program when the stock-index futures sell at a premium to the index.
Once the spread reaches the required amount, the computer initiates
orders to buy the stocks that make up the index and sell the corresponding futures short. These buy-stocks/sell-futures orders constitute
the most prevalent form of program trading.
Conversely, if the futures are selling at a discount to the index, the
trader executes a sell program. The sell program initiates orders to buy
the stock-index futures and sell the underlying securities short. This
program is inherently more difficult to execute because of the up-tick
rule.2 ' The up-tick rule provides that, before someone may sell a stock
short, the stock price must experience an a slight upward movement in
its price. Thus, a sell program must wait until all the stocks in the index (which could range from 20 for the MMI to 500 for the S&P) un22
dergo an up-tick before execution of the short sales.
When executing an order for the sale or purchase of stocks; the
trader has two options. First, he can write an order sheet manually, deliver it to a specialist's post on the floor of the stock exchange, and wait
for the execution of the order. Alternatively, the trader can connect his
computer to a market's automated trading system. Automated systems
allow a trader to sell or purchase large blocks of stock with a push of a
button. 23 Unlike the manual system, the automated system enables the
trader to execute an order quickly and cheaply by avoiding the specialist. Program traders thus take advantage of the NYSE's designated order turnaround system (DOT-system) 24 to execute trades. By some
estimates the time-frame (from computer identification of an cash/futures price discrepancy to execution of trades based on that discrep25
ancy) to safely execute a trade may be as long as twenty minutes.
Most traders feel safer using the DOT-system because the use of the
computer virtually assures completion of the trade within the twenty
1986, at 52. See also Laderman and Frank, supra note 2, at 72 (most investors tracking the
S&P 500 use at least 300 of the component stocks).
21. Campbell, Futures: Call of the Stock Index, THE BANKER, Jan. 1987, at 93 (it is
suggested that this rule adversely effects the market and should be abandoned); Levinson,
Program Trading May Help The Small Investor, FUTURES, March 1987, at 12.
22. Stoll and Whaley, Program Trading and Expiration-DayEffects, FIN. ANALYST J.,
March-April 1987, at 16 [hereinafter Stoll and Whaley].
23. Program TraderNelson Says It Ain't So, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1987, at 63, col. 1 (an
impatient trader, intending to buy one $25 million package of securities, hit his order button four times and later received a confirmation for $100 million in stock).
24. IndustrialsPlunge 156.83 Points in Heavy Trading; Bond Prices Surge, and Dollar FallsAgainst the Mark, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1987, at 3, col. 1 (the DOT-system matches
sale and purchase orders for large blocks of specific stocks and executes the trade).
25. Id.
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minute time-frame. Failure to complete the series of trades based on
the computer model constitutes one of the risks the program trader
faces. This risk is similar to changes in individual stock prices which
26
create an unprofitable spread.
The following example illustrates a hypothetical buy program for
the Major Market Index (MMI): On April 1, 1986, an investor
purchases 1,000 shares of the twenty stocks in the MMI (except that
1,500 of General Motors shares and 900 of Mobile Oil Co. shares are
purchased to create precisely equal dollar amounts for the MMI stock
portfolio and the futures position) for a total investment of $1,527,075.
The value of the cash index is $337.19 and is calculated by dividing the
sum of the component stock prices ($1,486.75) by the MMI divisor
(4.40914). The price of the April MMI futures contract is $339.35. Total
contract value, $25027 times $339.35, is $84,837.50. Dividing the value of
the stocks in the MMI portfolio ($1,527,075) by the value of one futures
contract ($84,837.50) equals 18 contracts. The computer issues short
sales orders for the eighteen futures contracts totaling $1,527,075.00. On
April 2, 1986, excessive selling of the futures contract pushes it to a discount relative to the cash position. A sell program issued at this time,
when the value of the portfolio is $1,495,962.50 and the futures contract
is priced at $329.80, brings a loss of $31,112.50 on the stock and a gain of
$42,975.00 on the futures. Thus, a two day trade grosses a total of
$11,862.50, all risk free. 28
Arbitrage in general, including program trading, is considered risk
free because once an investor gets into a position, he doesn't care which
way the market goes. Because, by definition, the value of the stock-index is equal to the value of the futures at expiration. Since stock-index
futures require cash settlement, the trader can wait until the day the
futures expire and close out the position. 29 To insure maximum profit,
the trader executes this close-out at the end of the day with a marketon-close order. A market-on-close order indicates to the specialist that
he must execute the trade for the securities immediately before the
26. See Stoll and Whaley, supra note 22, at 18 (program traders face two other forms
of risk. First, is an unanticipated change in the dividend yield of a stock or stocks over
the life of the futures contracts. Second, if all the stocks in the index are not purchased,
the trader is exposed to tracking risk). See also supra, notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
27. This is an arbitrary figure known as the "index multiplier." See BYRNE, supra
note 10, at 36 (the S&P 500 has an index multiplier of $500).
28. Selkin and Walsh, ProgramTrading In Action: How An Aberration Pays Off, FuTURES, July 1986, at 52. See Laderman, Weiss, et.al., supra note 19, at 32, 34 (for another
example of a buy program using the MMI); Fitzgerald, Wall St. Warlocks and Triple
Witching Hours, THE BANKER, March 1987, at 22, 24.
29. Faust and Doukas, Taking the Bite Out of Stock Index Futures Arbitrage Volatility, FUTURES, Dec. 1985, at 50.
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closing bell, at 3:59 p.m. 30 If, however, the value of the index and the
futures converge prior to the expiration date, then the program automatically unwinds.
If the market rises after the execution of the buy program, the
profits made on the rise in the price of the stock exceeds the losses on
the repurchase of the futures contract. Conversely, if the market falls,
losses on the sale of stock offset the gains accrued on the purchase of
the cheaper futures contracts.
In 1985 and 1986, profit margins on the program trading transactions typically ranged from three to five percentage points more than
the Federal Government's Treasury bill rate, the measure of a risk-free
rate of return. An increase in the number of program traders since
1986, however, restricts the spread, thus reducing the amount of profit
to be made from program trading. In 1988, traders can execute only
when a program guarantees a return, upon expiration of the futures
contract, equal to the prevailing Treasury-bill rate. 31 Why would an investor invest a large amount of capital in an activity that guarantees
only a risk free rate? An investor anticipates that the price of the futures contract and the index's cash value converge before the expiration
32
day, thus raising the rate of return.
III.

PROBLEMS AND BENEFITS OF PROGRAM TRADING

Every disaster needs a villain. In the securities' markets of 1987,
program trading played that role. Computerized stock-index arbitrage
has been singled out as the source of a number of market ills. At the
same time, however, a number of market regulators and traders praise
the use of program trading as a technological improvement to the
system.
A.

MARKET VOLATILITY

The increase in market volatility constituted the most significant
trend of the stock market during 1987. The problem with market volatility is that the "health" of the market is measured by the performance
of the stock indexes. Market volatility is measured by a combination of
three factors: percentage change in the value of an index, number of
traded shares during a day and the time-frame of the occurring movement. The DJIA moved only 6% on January 23, 1987. 33 This movement
occurred in only seventy minutes and almost 50 million shares of com30. Curse of New York and Spreading, THE BANKER, Nov. 1986, at 59.

31. Frank and Laderman, Program Trading Has Lost Its Punch, Bus. Wx., July 27,
1987, at 58.
32. Id.
33. FrenziedStock Trading,supra note 2, at 25 (during the 1929 crash, the DJIA fell
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panies composing the DJIA were traded in a half-hour period. s4 If this
type of movement had occurred with the market as a whole instead of
only in the DJIA, there would have been some cause for concern.
Large movements in indices such as the DJIA are rarely matched by
similar movements in broader based indices, like the Standard & Poor
500 or Wilshire 5000. Using the DJIA as the main yardstick of market
health therefore distorts disproportionately real changes in the economic environment.
Using traditional methods, a securities analyst considers a company's financial condition, growth potential, and the general economic
environment to determine the proper valuation of a given stock. The
value of a stock, through its sale price, reflects this information. Regulators are concerned that program trading shifts the focus of securities
valuation away from the above traditional factors. It is a general misconception, however, that program trading is a case of the tail wagging
the dog. Information regarding specific securities is reflected in the securities' prices in both the stock markets and the futures markets. Program trading simply assures that the information in the stock market
corresponds with the information in the futures markets. Program
trading does not introduce its own information into market prices and
dictate the direction share prices will take.
Program trading is not a method used to evaluate securities to
make an informed purchase. By using a computer, a trader reduces the
buying and selling decisions to simple price differentials. If the numbers are right for a computer program, orders for large blocks of securities are issued. When large orders of stocks that comprise an index are
made in a relatively short period of time, extreme volatility results in
that index. Program traders use these same indexes for their arbitrage
transactions. Thus, depending upon which spread has reached the
proper point, one stock-index moves greatly relative to other stock
35

indices.

While some critics of program trading point to specific days when
the indices moved sharply, usually on the down side, studies done by
brokerage houses36 show that market price fluctuations, as a percentmore than 10% on each of two consecutive trading days). See also Stocks Plunge, supra
note 3 and accompanying text.
34. See Laderman and Frank, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
35. See Laderman and Frank, supra note 2, at 73 (the MMI funnels large amounts of
capital into relatively few stocks. This has a large effect on the DJIA). See also BYRNE,
supra note 10; Faust and Doukas, supra note 29, at 50 (arbitragers tend to key off the
same indicators, resulting in unusual pricing action).
36. See Nisse, Semantics of Arbitrage,THE BANKER, Jan. 1987, at 91 (a study done by
the economists at Salomon Brothers points to a decline in volatility as a result of program
trading).
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age, have not changed significantly over the past twenty years. 37 On a
percentage basis, a market change of twenty points in a two thousand
point market, for example, is the same as a ten point change in a one
thousand point market.-3
The greatest potential for market volatility occurs four days of
every year. It is during these four days, that all options and futures expire; these are known as "triple witching hours. ' 39 The prices of futures and indexes on these four days are guaranteed to converge. 40 The
convergence triggers the volume of buy and sell orders the program
trader needs to execute to close out his position.
The market becomes most volatile at the end of the trading day
when there is a triple witching hour. As mentioned, the price of the futures contract and the cash value of the index are equal at the close of
trading on a triple witching hour. A program trader initiates his programs on the assumption that he can take advantage of the full spread,
i.e. that any difference between the price of the futures and the stock
index will be reduced to zero when the position is closed out. The
trader guarantees the maximum profit possible by issuing market-onclose orders when the spread between the index and the futures approaches zero.
A study by Hans Stoll of Vanderbilt University confirms that stockindex related trading affects market prices during triple witching hours.
The study shows, however, that the triple witching effect on prices does
not warrant a restriction on stock-index arbitrage. 4 1 Stoll argues that
the effect of program trading on stock prices is similar to the effect on
prices of a large purchase or sale of a block of stocks, which can occur at
any time. 42
B.

ACCENTUATED DOWN-SIDE MOVEMENTS

During 1987, the volatile market posted large single day gains and
losses. Critics of program trading surfaced with claims that computerized trading accentuates a market decline by means of a snowball effect.
37. See Laderman, Weiss, et.al., supra note 19, at 36 (stating: "Traders challenge volatility charges by showing that the number of days in which the market moved more than
2% was greater coming off the bottom of the 1982 bull market than it has been in the past
three months").
38. Contra Angrist, The Not So Awful Truth, FORBES, March 23, 1987, at 180 (critics
claim that analysis using percentage of market hides the volatility. Studies using the
maximum daily price change as a measure show that volatility was lower in "three of the
past four years than in ten of the thirteen years preceding 1983).
39. Fitzgerald, supra note 28, at 22.
40. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
41. Stoll, Expiration Day Effects of Index Options and Futures (1987).
42. Id.
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Snowballing occurs when stock-index futures selling at a discount to
the underlying basket of stocks lead traders to buy the cheap futures
and sell the stocks. In turn, the sale of stock lowers the price of stocks
and consequently of the futures.43 More futures are then purchased
and more stocks sold, causing further decline. During the days following "Black Monday" critics asserted that program trading caused the
crash with a snowball effect.
While sound in theory, little evidence exists to prove that the market reacts as depicted above. Weeks after the market's crash in 1987, investigators found that program trading accounted for only 9% of trading
volume on the day of the crash and most of those program trades were
executed early in the day.44 Moreover, when a market is in decline, sell
programs call for the short sale of stocks. Short sales are not always
possible, however, because they are limited by the up-tick rule 45 and demand to purchase stocks diminishes.
Stock-index related strategies 46 other than program trading, may
have contributed to the market's decline in 1987. For example, fund
managers utilize portfolio insurance on Black Monday in order to protect the value of their investments. 47 Portfolio insurance involves the
systematic sale of stock-index futures in a declining market. Proceeds
from the sale of the futures offset losses from the drop in value of
stocks. When the market begins to rise again, the futures are repurchased so the fund manager can "zero out" the account's position. 48
Front running4 9 also added to the 1987 market decline. This practice combines sale and purchase of stocks and futures. Unlike program
trading, front running is not a form of arbitrage and requires no com43. Traditional economic theory leads one to believe that an increase in demand in
futures leads to an increase in their prices. The prices of stock-index futures, however,
are not controlled solely by their supply and demand. Futures traders also base their
pricing based on the change in value of the corresponding stock.
44. CFTC Reports On Index Arbitrage In Market Crash, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1987, at
35, col. 1 [hereinafter CFTC Reports]. See also Advisory Group Urges Revised Bona Fide
Hedging Definition, 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 424 (1987) (program trading accounted for
only 4% of volume on Jan. 23, 1987). Cf Frenzied Stock Trading,supra note 2 (most program trading on Jan. 23, 1987 occurred early in the day).
45. See supra, notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
46. BYRNE, supra note 10, at 190 (some non-arbitrage program trading allows money
managers to establish or liquidate a large portfolio as inexpensively as possible).
47. CFTC Reports, supra note 44, at 43, col. 1 (investigation after October 19, showed
that portfolio insurance was a predominant in the decline than program trading). See
also Portfolio InsuranceHelps Investors but Hurts Market, Wall St. J., Oct. 19, 1987, at 16,
col. 5.
48. See Garcia and Gould, An EmpiricalStudy of Portfolio Insurance, FIN. ANALYST
J., July-August 1987, at 44 (for an in-depth discussion of portfolio insurance).
49. See Crusade, supra note 6, at 135 (brokers are barred from trading stocks for
themselves before trading the same stocks for customers).
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puter. The following is an example of front running: A client places an
order with a broker to sell a large block of XYZ stock. Relying on the
client's order, the broker purchases futures contracts in anticipation of
a fall in the price of XYZ stock. 5° The purchase of the futures causes
other traders to follow suit, pulling down the price of XYZ stock, which
falls even further on the sale of the client's block of XYZ stock. Examination of the preceding example reveals that front running should
cause market regulators to scrutinize the ethical implications of the broker-client relationship. 5 1
C.

INVESTOR CONFIDENCE

Market regulators are concerned about the confidence of investors
in the market because of the 1987 crash. Investors who see price movements that do not correlate to changes in the economy or in corporate
production may refrain from investing in the market.5 2 The market
moved sharply on several days during 1987, yet the economic forecast
remained relatively stable. This stability indicates that factors other
than the economy moves influence market movement. Federal securities laws and securities markets are premised on the notion that the
small stakes individual investor has a fair chance to trade in stocks.
While most individual investors don't possess the same economic resources as large institutional investors, the rules for investment should
be the same for both types of investors.
Statistics show that institutional investment comprises 90% of trading volume.53 Some charge that "program trading disrupts the notion of
an open and fair game.... [as] program trading requires access to millions of dollars, quick access to multiple trading floors, and the ability to
trade with very low transaction costs." '54 Others feel, however, that program trading helps individual investors by increasing market efficiency
55
and market liquidity.
D.

MARKET EFFICIENCY

Most critics of program trading fail to realize that stock-index arbitrage is a way of ensuring that prices of different, but related, securities
50. Kirby PartiallyBoycotts 3 Brokerages, L.A. Times, Jan. 15, 1988, § IV, at 1, col. 2.
51. CFTC Urges Better Market CoordinationAnd Halt to Practiceof 'FrontRunning,
Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1988, at 2, col. 3.
52. See Big Board Trading Halt Was ConsideredAfter Crash, SEC Chiefs Testimony
Says, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
53. Campbell, Futures: Call Of The Stock Index, THE BANKER, January, 1987, at 93,

94.
54. Wall St. Needs To Bring Small Investor Into Program Trading, Grundfust States,
18 SEC. REG.& L.REP. 1612, 1613 (1986).
55. See Levinson, supra note 21, at 12.
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remain in line. Having stock prices in line means that they are properly
evaluated based on factors such as interest cost and dividend yield, not
merely on speculation. The introduction of stock options in the Chicago
stock market fifteen years ago created the opportunity for arbitrage on
a stock-by-stock basis. Using simple computer programs, investors
could determine whether a stock option was priced correctly and could
take advantage of price differentials. The market became more efficient because computers incorporated information into prices faster.
The use of computers to arbitrage options soon disappeared, however,
because market participants could no longer profit from stock-by-stock
arbitrage. 56 An increase in the number of traders executing options arbitrage narrowed the price differential so that the spread attained the
proper level.
Since program trading began three years ago, the number of program traders dramatically increased. Their computer programs utilize
the information relating to price discrepancies and execute buy and sell
programs. A large number of market participants who constantly monitor the prices of stocks and futures prevent large price discrepancies be57
tween the stocks and the futures.
What troubles most market watchers is the rate at which information is incorporated into prices. A move in the market which in the past
spread out over days or perhaps weeks is now compressed into one or
two days. Formerly, dissatisfaction with three consecutive twenty-point
drops in the DJIA is replaced now with grave concern over a single
sixty-point drop in the DJIA.
E.

MARKET LIQUIDITY

In addition to keeping stock prices in line, program trading increases market liquidity. A market is considered liquid when an investor wishing to buy or sell shares of stock can readily find a willing
buyer or seller. Program trading has increased market liquidity by funneling billions of dollars into the market over the past few years. The
result is an increase in futures trading which results in more selling and
buying opportunities and therefore greater liquidity. 58 Increased liquidity also result in lower costs of capital.
56. Programmed For Change?, FIN. WORLD, July 22, 1986, at 12.
57. Abbott, Jeffrey Tabak
1986, at 106.

Special Knack For Arbitraging Indexes, FUTURES, April

58. See Trading Halts Could Dampen Volatility, SEC Official Tells FIA Annual Gathering, 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 456 (1987) (Chicago Mercantile Exchange president William

Brodsky says U.S. markets are more liquid as a result of financial commodities).
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IV.

THE "SOLUTIONS"

Worried about the "perceived" problems of program trading, various regulators are demanding action.5 9 These demands have resulted in
several proposed courses of action, most of which do not regulate but
attempt to restrict the program trading activity. The regulators reaction is "like blaming the floor for breaking a dropped egg," says one
market analyst. 6° Institutions, fearing regulation, have voluntarily suspended their own use of program trading.
A.

SUSPEND AUToMATED TRADING

The form of regulation which most closely affects program trading
is suspension of automated trading. John Phelan, Chairman of the
NYSE, suspended use of the market's DOT-system on October 20, 1987,
the day after the 508 point drop in the DJIA. Phelan's action was
highly unusual; the last time the market was shut down followed the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. He claimed that program trading on
October 19, 1987, partly caused the market crash; only suspension of au6
tomated trading could prevent any further effects of program trading. '
Phelan's actions succeeded in restricting the use of program trading. During the two week suspension of the DOT-system, most program
traders could not execute trades. While it was still technically possible
for a program trader to work the market because the computers were
not banned, the lack of an automated system with a corresponding manual execution of trades made the time frame too large6 2 for traders to
execute.6 3 Following the market crash, stock-index futures sold at a
discount to the index. For an arbitrageur to use the program trading,
he needed to short sell the stocks in the index and to buy the cheap futures. With the NYSE's up-tick rule, this practice became nearly impossible;64 by the time each stock in the index moved on an up-tick and the
trader manually executed the orders, the stock price could have moved
again.
Suspension of program trading created a disadvantage for the market. First, by reducing the liquidity of the market, it raised the costs of
executing trades. Some analysts estimated that transaction costs from
59. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

60. How Computers Bewitch The Market, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 1986, at 87.
61. Big Board Curb on Electronic Trading Results in Halt at Stock-Index Markets,

Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1987, at 3, col. 1. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (for a description of the DOT-system).
62. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
63. Program Trading Eases Under Rules Set by Big Board, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1987, at

22, col. 5.
64. CFTC Reports On Index Arbitrage In Market Crash, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1987, at

35, col. 1.
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relying on the specialist instead of the DOT-system increased 66%.65
Second, the suspension reduced market efficiency. Large spreads between stock indexes and their corresponding futures increased during
the days after the suspension of the DOT-system. Due to the suspension, pricing information was not incorporated into the prices of the financial instruments. Third, a number of institutional investors stated
that suspension of the DOT-system led to greater price volatility in both
the stock and commodities markets.66 Finally, suspension hinders market confidence by informing traders that various forms of market access
may be denied by the stock exchanges at any time.
The New York Stock Exchange, after months of deliberation, settled on a systematic scheme for suspending use of the DOT-system.
Similar to a daily price limit,6 7 the Big Board decided to suspend use of
the computerized trading system anytime the DJIA moves more than
68
50 points in one day.

B.

TRADING HALTS

In June of 1987, House Representatives Norman Lent (R-NY) and
Matthew Rinaldo (R-NJ) introduced the Securities Trading Reform Act
of 1987.69 Lent and Rinaldo designed the bill to restrict trading activity
surrounding tender offers and takeovers. An amendment added to the
bill allows trading halts by the exchanges if the situation is appropriate.
This part of the bill states: "Because excessive volatility may occur on
or before days on which securities based options and futures contracts
expire, permitting trading halts to extend to the markets for those options and futures is justified in the public interest to moderate the ef''70
fects of certain program trading.
How the bill functions in practice remains unclear. In addition, the
notion that a trading halt remedies the negative effects of program trading is also not clear. First, a trader must have already begun a buy or
sell program before an official could deem it necessary to close a market
as a result of harmful program trading. As previously mentioned, once
in position, the trader is not concerned with the direction of the market.
Second, if fear exists that the market will fall when a program trader
65. Some Big Investors Cheer, Others Fear Resumption of Program Trading Today,

Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
66. Chaotic Week Illustrates Widening Rift Between Stock and Stock-Index Exchanges, Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1987, at 18, col. 1.
67. See infra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
68.

Richter, NYSE Votes to Tighten Program Trading Rules, L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1988,

§ IV, at 1, col. 4.
69. H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See also House Subcommittee Republicans Introduce Tender Offer Reform Bill, 19 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 849 (1987).
70.

H.R. 2668, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 110 (1987) (emphasis added).
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sells stocks purchased through a buy program, calling for a trading halt
merely delays, not ends, the sale.
The justification for trading halts is that the market needs time to
disseminate information that affects the prices of stocks. It is odd, however, that dissemination of information is attempted through a halt in
trading instead of through computers that electronically link the markets together. Up-to-the-minute information is no longer accessible to
the institutional investor. Individuals have an array of sources from
which they can access with a personal computer.7 1 Trading halts are
theoretically reserved for times when severe investor panic causes steep
market declines and large order imbalances. Severe investor panic is
not caused by program trading; trading halts are not effective weapons
to combat the effects of investor panic.
Like suspension of automated trading, trading halts hurt the credibility of the market and reduce the confidence of investors entering and
getting out of trading positions. In the days following the October crash
of 1987, rumors of the market closing shattered confidence in the
72
market.
C.

DAILY PRICE LIMITS

An alternative approach to trading halts, and one considered less
intrusive,73 is the use of daily price limits. The commodities markets
are heavily blamed for the effects of program trading. Officials at the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission have proposed alternatives
for regulating the market. One proposal is the use of daily price limits.
A daily price limit restricts the sale price range of a commodity on any
given trading day. Most non-financial commodities have daily price
limits which are designed to prevent speculative excesses and to maintain an orderly market by allowing traders to evaluate the factors influencing wide fluctuations that may not be immediately evident on the
trading floor. This form of regulation, at first glance, may seem perfect
for the stock-index future.
Futures contracts for gold can move a maximum of $50 per ounce.
For example, if, on November 23, the December futures contract for
gold opens at $466 per ounce, it could sell no higher than $516 per ounce
and no lower than $416 per ounce on that trading day. Most daily price
limits for non-financial commodities have expanding limit provisions for
extensive price movements. Some expansion provisions allow an in71. For a list of different informational sources, see Nicholes, Commodities Futures
Trading 1-27 (pricing), 29-57 (newspapers), 112-14 (journals) (1985).
72. Washout Poses Threat to Futureof Stock-Index Markets, Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1987,
at 6, col. 1.
73. Abbot, Trading Halt Idea Hits A Wall, FUTURES, May, 1987, at 24.
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crease in the limit to 150% of the value of the futures contracts if the
futures contract reaches its price limit on three consecutive days. Thus,
if gold ends the trading day selling at $516 per ounce on November 23,
moves to $566 per ounce on November 24, and again to $616 per ounce
on November 25, the daily price limit is raised to $75. In the past, the
Chicago commodities markets have proposed various limit ranges; a
limit of twelve points for the S&P 500's was proposed. This equals a
movement of approximately 97 points for the DJIA. 74 Following the
October 19 decline, Chicago imposed a limit of 30 points for the S&P 500
(equivalent to 242.5 points for the DJIA) as an "emergency action."
The action also included an expansion provision for the to be 150% of
75
the stock value if, after two days, it reached the price limit.
The typical movement for the S&P 500 is five to eight points a day;
a thirty-point cap therefore may seem harmless. Pricing limitations
hinder the commodities markets, however, and do not restrict the use of
program trading. Yet, most concede that the daily price limit has psychological effects and appeases regulators in Washington, who might do
something more serious - like ban financial commodities based on
stock-index futures.
If the market is sharply rising or declining, price limits on the
stock-index futures could also be damaging. Unlike other commodities
which have daily price limits and are tied to the supply and demand of
tangible objects, stock-index futures are based on an intangible item shares representing ownership in a corporation. In times of extreme
market volatility, a stock index could continue to rise in price but leave
behind the stock index futures once they have reached a price limit.
This scenario would create the unusual situation of a futures contract
selling at a discount to the cash value of an index while the market is
rising. A continued rise in the price of stocks would thus create a large
spread between the cash value and the future values of the index. If
the spread gets large enough, sell programs would flood the market
with orders. Short selling the stocks would be relatively easy while the
market is moving up. Buying the relatively cheap futures, however,
would be difficult, if not impossible, under a price freeze.
D.

CHANGED EXPIRATION TIMES

Another form of commodity regulation is a change in expiration
times. Usually, all stock futures and options expire at the close of the
trading day on the third Friday of the expiration month. In an attempt
74. Chicago's Traders Are Trying To Be Their Own Best Watchdogs, Bus. WK., March
2, 1987, at 38.
75. Chicago Merc Sets Daily Limit On Price Swings, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 2,

col. 2.
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to limit price volatility on expiration Fridays, regulators moved the expiration of stock-index futures with June, 1987, contract expirations

from the close of the market on the third Friday to the opening of the
market on the third Friday. By examining information regarding order
imbalances, the regulators noted that minimal volatility occurred during the June expiration period.7 6 This experiment is, however, inconclusive in showing that the change in expiration time leads to less
77
volatility in all cases. Some assert that it may increase volatility.
The change in expiration dates, while directed at program trading,
has little to do with the regulation of computerized trading. Instead, it
seems directed at the general effect of stock-index futures expiring on a
specific day.

E.

ORDER DISCLOSURE

Another form of regulation of the expiration date of futures is the
disclosure of market-on-close orders for futures contracts. 78 Program
traders issue market-on-close orders to obtain maximum profit potential. If a trader wishes to close-out a buy program, a larger number of
shares of stock must be sold. At the close of the market, a specialist
must be able to fill all orders and find the necessary buyers. At this
point, the supply of shares of stock exceeds the normal demand and the
prices of the shares fall. To prevent a fall in price, the disclosure allows
floor traders to match the requisite number of buyers to sellers over the
course of a few hours rather than at the close of the trading day. 79
Market-on-close orders address the closing of a position based on a
buy program at the time the trader sells his stock and meets his future
contracts payments. This form of regulation does not attempt to regulate the practice of program trading but helps the market adjust to the
practice. Second, order disclosures ignore the closing of positions based
on sell programs. Thus a flood of buy orders arise and the share prices
increase. Regulators seem to be willing to accept sudden increases in
share prices.

76. SEC Says Program Trading Changes Greatly Reduced Volatility Woes, 19 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. 1083 (1987).
77. 'Perception Problem' Cited In Program Trading Discussion, 18 SEC. REG. & L.

REP. 1001 (1986).
78. See The Triple Witching Hour: Trying To Make It Less Spooky, Bus. WK., Sept.
22, 1986, at 32 (the SEC has suggested that the NYSE require its members to disclose their
market-on-close orders by 3:30 p.m.).
79. See SEC Staff To Pursue Ways To Limit Expiration Friday Price Volatility, 18
SEC. REG. & L. REP. 795 (1986).
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V. CONCLUSION
Program trading increases market efficiency by incorporating information into stock prices and stock-index futures. Many regulators,
looking for a way to stem market volatility or to avoid large price falls,
have determined that program trading should be restricted. Yet, many
of the proposals restrict trading in ways unrelated to program trading,
increase transaction costs, or increase market volatility. Program trading doesn't determine which way the market will head, it only gets it
there faster. As for the regulation of program trading, Senator Phil
Gramm (R-Texas) said it best when he commented, "if by eliminating
the use of the computer, you could get stock prices higher, I suggest you
outlaw the use of the calculator ... and order that trades be chiseled in
80
stone."
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